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Citizenship and resource control in Nigeria: the case of 





The struggle for resource control by communities in the oil-producing areas 
in the Niger Delta assumed a central position in the discourse on the na-
tional question, ethnic minority politics and environmental degradation in 
Nigeria from the early 1990s. This is largely due to the activities of Ken 
Saro-Wiwa and his Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People 
(MOSOP) that greatly helped to popularise and internationalise the issue. 
Available scholarly work has concentrated on ethnic minority politics, the 
restructuring of Nigeria’s federalism and environmental degradation. 
However, little effort has been made to interrogate the significance and im-
plications of the resource control issue for the citizenship rights of Nigeri-
ans, in particular, the people of the oil-producing communities. The mar-
ginalisation of the citizenship rights of the minority oil-producing commu-
nities helped to fuel the resort to ethnic citizenship rights agitation as the 
basis for resource control. This paper states that the operation of a true fed-
eralism in Nigeria has to be accompanied by meaningful devolution of 
power at the local level, to ensure that the common people have better con-
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he dispute over resource control between the six South-South states of the 
Niger Delta (Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo and Rivers 
states), and the federal government of Nigeria has once again helped to bring 
into sharp focus this salient aspect of the national question in Nigeria. The 
issue of resource control has been an important aspect of Nigeria’s political 
                                                 
1  The author acknowledges the helpful comments of the anonymous reviewers and the 
editors of Afrika Spectrum , on the first draft of this paper.  
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economy from the colonial period particularly with the introduction of a lop-
sided federal system of government in the 1950s, which intensified the roles 
of regionalism and ethnicity in the country’s politics. However, the issue as-
sumed a more prominent role in the 1990s. This is due mainly to the sustained 
struggle by the Niger Delta oil-producing communities, more prominently 
exemplified by the Ogoni struggle under the auspices of the Movement for 
the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). Under the leadership of the dy-
namic and charismatic writer and activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa, MOSOP helped to 
popularise and internationalise the resource control controversy (Saro-Wiwa, 
1992; UNPO, 1995; Apter, 1998, MacIntyre 1996). 
 The context for this struggle for resource control was provided by the 
wanton neglect of the oil-producing communities from whose territories the 
bulk of Nigeria’s revenue is derived (Etim et. al., 2001; Sesebo & Ollor-Obari, 
2001). This has been accentuated by the perceived marginalisation of the citi-
zenship rights of the people of these communities, mainly because they be-
long to ethnic minority groups. Nevertheless, two broad levels of the struggle 
can be identified, namely, the governmental level and the non-governmental 
level. The non-governmental level includes pan-Niger Delta groups, ethnic 
and communal mass-based associations, youth groups and environmental 
activist groups. In virtually all the cases, the struggle has been cast in the form 
of citizenship rights.  
 However, the different groups involved in the struggle for resource 
control reveal some form of contradictions and tendencies in the movement. 
Many of the mass-based ethnic and communal movements and some of the 
youth groups, are largely motivated by the marginalisation of the citizenship 
rights of their people in terms of the use and control of the resources located 
in their land. The same cannot be said of the state-led agitation. Given the 
activities and orientation of the state governors since they assumed office in 
the fourth republic, it can be argued that they are more interested in resource 
control for the sake of patronage activities and primitive accumulation rather 
than the citizenship rights of their people (Odunlami, 2004; Oguntimehin, 
2004). Similarly, part of the leadership of the mainly elitist pan-Niger Delta 
movements are in cohort with the federal government and are, therefore, 
accomplices in the exploitation of their people. They nevertheless want to be 
relevant at the local scene and retain the loyalty of their people by posing as 
champions of the agitation for resource control and the attendant citizenship 
rights. For some people therefore, the agitation has become a form of oppor-
tunism to be used to embark on self-serving and self-aggrandising move-
ments. All these help to demonstrate the complex nature of the controversy. 
 Although the agitation of the minority oil-producing communities has 
helped to popularise the resource control controversy, there are more dimen-
sions to the controversy. The issue of indigeneity as enshrined in successive 
Nigerian constitutions, promoted the emergence of natives and non-natives in 
various Nigerian communities. This has been a source of conflict over re-
 





source control. No matter how long a person from an ethnic group, commu-
nity or state has lived in another ethnic group, community or state and regu-
larly fulfilled his or her civic obligations, the person remains a stranger. Such 
a person is not entitled to the same citizenship rights as members of the host 
ethnic group. Some of the recent inter-communal urban conflicts over market 
rights, for instance the conflicts between Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani traders in 
Lagos and Ibadan, are partly attributable to this distinction between natives 
and non-natives. Also some conflicts between communities in neighboring 
states, and between communities within a specific state, over farming and 
grazing lands, for instance, are in actuality struggle over resource control. 
Another dimension of the struggle is that of communities that have been dis-
possessed of their vital resources by government policies, as was the case with 
the Bakolori crisis in 1980. The crisis was engendered by the massive land 
alienation and adverse environmental impact of the Bakolori irrigation 
scheme (Oculi, 1982). 
 In any case, this paper will concentrate on the struggle for resource con-
trol by the Niger Delta oil-producing communities. It will, however, be neces-
sary to first of all operationalise the concept of citizenship. This will not in-
volve a detailed discussion of the genesis, evolution and contending perspec-
tives on citizenship: rather it will attempt to clarify the context within which 
the term citizenship is used in this paper. 
 
 
The problematic of citizenship 
 
Citizenship as used in modern Nigeria is defined in the Western sense. It 
essentially entails the transplanting of the Western attributes of citizenship as 
they were transformed by the liberal and bourgeois European revolutions of 
the 18th and 19th centuries, into Africa. The Rousseaunian concept of citizen-
ship as a social contract between individuals and the state entailing the rights 
and duties of citizens as well as the liberal and bourgeois conception of indi-
viduality, individual property rights, individual accumulation, and competi-
tive relations, were reproduced in various post-colonial Nigerian constitu-
tions. This negated the principles of collectivism, communalism and coopera-
tion that constituted critical aspects of citizenship in pre-colonial African so-
cieties and helped to provide social security for members of the communities. 
However, the multi-ethnic make up of Nigeria and the intra-bourgeois com-
petition for offices and resources that characterise neo-colonial Nigeria, pro-
duced the need for the promotion of bourgeois unity, misconstrued as na-
tional unity, through a form of affirmative action. The federal character prin-
ciple which was portrayed as helping to promote unity and protect citizen-
ship rights by granting equal access to offices and resources to every Nigerian 
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irrespective of ethnic origin, was devised and enshrined in successive Nige-
rian constitutions since 1979. 
 However, by emphasizing indignity and therefore a person’s ethnicity 
as the basis for appointment into offices, the principle in effect produces the 
antithesis to national unity in that it fosters ethnically salient candidates 
whose primary loyalty are to their respective ethnic groups (Bach, 1997). Also, 
the principle contradicts the liberal conception of citizenship as contained in 
the respective constitutions that emphasise the primacy of individuality and 
competition over consensus. Thus, implicit in the federal character principle 
are competitions for offices as well as the resources controlled by incumbents. 
 Abubakar Momoh (2001) has identified three categories of citizenship in 
Nigeria, namely, constitutional citizenship, ethnic citizenship and diasporic 
citizenship. Constitutional citizenship is defined in terms of the provisions 
relating to citizenship as enshrined in the various Nigerian constitutions. This 
category of citizenship is based on the inherited liberal/bourgeois definition 
of citizenship. It clearly defines the rights and duties of every citizen and sup-
posedly guarantees the equality of every citizen. Nevertheless, the bases for 
acquiring constitutional citizenship in Nigeria are by birth and naturalisation. 
 As demonstrated by Mahmood Mamdani (1996) and P. P. Ekeh (1975), 
the colonial policy of indirect rule under the native authority system which 
bifurcated African societies into two, namely civic and native (ethnic), formed 
the basis for the creation of the ethnic citizen. The civic public, which formed 
the basis for the acquisition of the civic identity, was not open to Africans 
because as natives they were deemed to belong to their ancestral ethnic or 
primordial sphere and therefore ethnic citizens. This bifurcated nature of 
African societies created by the colonial policy of divide and rule, and the fact 
that ethnic identity formed the basis of a person’s participation in the colonial 
society helped to create and sustain the phenomenon of ethnic citizenship 
(Ekeh 1972: 91). The reproduction of these colonial policies in post-colonial 
Nigeria has resulted in the continued presence and salience of ethnic citizen-
ship. 
 Diasporic citizenship has existed since the colonial period when a num-
ber of Nigerians went abroad mainly for higher studies and some of them did 
not return home after their studies. This phenomenon continued in the post-
colonial period but assumed greater dimensions from the mid-1980s with the 
severe economic crisis and the existence of authoritarian military regimes that 
led to massive emigration of different categories of Nigerians. Although some 
of these emigrants acquired the citizenship of their host countries, they still 
retain their Nigerian citizenship. However, the first two categories of citizen-
ship are more relevant to this paper.  
 





Revenue allocation, citizenship and resource control  
 
The control of the wealth derived from natural resources and the manner of 
resource allocation has been a contentious issue in Nigeria right from the colo-
nial period, particularly with the emergence of the federal system of govern-
ment. The issue is expressed in the form of the constant controversy over the 
formula for allocating revenue among the constituent units of the federation 
(Oyovbaire, 1978; Adebayo, 1993). Particularly contentious has been the weight 
that should be accorded to the principle of derivation in the revenue allocation 
formula (Esajere, 2001). Derivation is seen as the primary vehicle through which 
the people from whose resources wealth is generated would exercise control 
over a significant portion of that wealth. It is, however, debatable whether in-
creasing the amount of revenue allocated to the government of a particular re-
gion or state through derivation actually translates to the control by the ordinary 
people over the wealth generated from the exploitation of their natural re-
sources. This issue will be addressed in another section of the paper. 
 The first attempt at devising a formula for revenue allocation in colonial 
Nigeria was in 1946, with the setting up of the Phillipson-Adebo Commission, 
which accompanied the Richards constitution. However, the Hicks-Phillipson 
Commission of 1951, was the first to attempt to clearly spell out the criteria on 
which revenue allocation should be based, namely, derivation, needs, national 
interest, population and even development, among others. The Commission 
gave great weight to derivation by providing that 100 percent of mineral rents 
and royalties and the proceeds from cash crops, be retained in the regions from 
where they were derived. The Chick Commission, which was set up in 1954 with 
the introduction of the federal constitution of that year and the Raisman Com-
mission of 1958, essentially followed the criteria of the Hicks-Phillipson Com-
mission, but the percentage for derivation was reduced to 50. The postcolonial 
1963 republican constitution equally granted 50 percent to derivation. 
 With the intervention of the military in Nigeria’s politics from 1966, the 
degree of control, which the constituent units of the federation exercised over 
their natural resources, was considerably undermined. Two reasons can be ad-
duced for this situation. First, and perhaps more important reason, is the fact that 
in line with the centralised command structure of the military, the administra-
tion of the Nigerian federation was centralised. Secondly, by the 1970s crude oil, 
which had become the main foreign exchange earner, was obtained from the 
land of the minority ethnic groups. The leaders of the majority ethnic groups 
therefore felt that it would be more in their interest for the control over natural 
resources to be centralised since such a situation would work more in favour of 
their ethnic groups in terms of allocating the national revenue. What was at play 
here was a crude form of granting precedence to ethnic citizenship while hiding 
under the guise of national interest and national development. 
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The first significant step toward fiscal centralisation was taken in 1969 when the 
Gowon regime assigned the responsibility of fashioning out a new revenue allo-
cation formula to the federal and state commissioners of finance under the 
chairmanship of Obafemi Awolowo, the then federal commissioner for finance. 
Between April 1969 and February 1970, this body organised three meetings, each 
of which lasted for two days. At the meetings, there were opposing views over 
the issue of revenue allocation formula between commissioners from the oil-
producing states and those from the non-oil producing states. Commissioners 
from the oil-producing states wanted a continuation of the existing formula 
whereby 50 percent of the oil rents and royalties went to the states of origin in 
line with the principle of derivation but this was opposed by those from the non-
oil producing states. Awolowo who hitherto was a strong advocate of fiscal and 
true federalism, clearly stated the position of the non-oil producing states by 
arguing that as a national wealth and gift of nature, no community can lay claim 
to the ownership of crude oil. Rather, the wealth generated from crude oil 
should be used for the overall development of the country (cited in Omoweh, 
1998: 36-37). 
 Nevertheless, based on the recommendations of the body of finance 
commissioners, the federal military government of Yakubu Gowon promulgated 
Decree No. 13 of 1970 (the effective date of the decree was backdated to April 1, 
1969). This decree, which spelt out a new revenue allocation formula, set in mo-
tion the process of increased centralisation of Nigeria’s fiscal system. It provided 
that the federal government retains 55 percent of the royalty and rents from 
crude oil while 45 percent would be paid to the oil-producing states on the basis 
of derivation. However, an amount of emphasis was still placed on derivation 
but the derivation principle would experience sharp decline in subsequent reve-
nue allocation formulas. 
 Between 1970 and 1980 further steps were taken to increase the concentra-
tion of the control over natural resources in the hands of the federal government. 
The Gowon regime promulgated Decree No. 9 of 1971, which abrogated ‘the 
rights of the (states) in the minerals in their continental shelves.’ The decree 
equally vested the ‘ownership and title to the territorial waters, continental shelf 
as well as royalties, rents and other revenues derived from or relating to the 
exploration, prospecting or searching for or winning or working of petroleum 
from the seaward appurtenances of the states,’ on the federal government. On 
the basis of this decree, proceeds from offshore oil exploration were excluded 
from the derivation funds allocated to the oil-producing states. In 1975, the deri-
vation component of revenue allocation, which continued to exclude proceeds 
from offshore oil exploration, was reduced to 20 percent and in 1979, derivation 
allocation to oil-producing states was discontinued (Esajere, 2001). 
 Furthermore, Section 40(3) of the 1979 constitution continued the trend of 
granting total control over offshore natural resources to the federal government. 
In spite of the constitutional and legal challenges to this provision by some of the 
oil-producing states, particularly the defunct Bendel and Cross River states, the 
 





Shehu Shagari administration (1979-83) was determined to retain the provision. 
However, in 1982, the Shagari administration enacted a law that allocated 1.5 
percent of the proceeds from oil, to the oil-producing states on the basis of deri-
vation. 
 The continued refusal by successive Nigerian administrations to increase 
the level of control that the oil-producing communities had over their natural 
resources, as well as the severe degrading environmental and social effects of oil 
exploration (Omoweh, 1995), resulted in increased agitation for resource control 
by the oil-producing communities. The increased level of agitation led to some 
minor concessions by the Babangida regime 1985-1993, which in 1992 raised the 
percentage of derivation in the revenue allocation formula to 3%. The regime 
equally established the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission 
(OMPADEC) to use the amount allocated under derivation to promote the de-
velopment of the oil-producing areas. In any case, the percentage allocation for 
derivation was so small and this, in addition to the bureaucratic red tapism and 
corruption associated with OMPADEC, contributed to the deterioration of the 
material and social conditions of the oil-producing communities (Frynas, 2001: 
36-39). With the advent of the fourth republic in 1999, the derivation component 
of revenue allocation was increased to 13. These minor concessions were not 
enough to mitigate the adverse effects of oil exploration. 
 The sustained neglect, unmitigated environmental degradation and wan-
ton deprivation of their citizenship rights made the resentment in the oil-
producing communities to get to a boiling point in the 1990s. The 1990s therefore 
witnessed the proliferation of groups in the Niger Delta agitating against their 
marginalisation and for the exercise of increased control over their natural re-
sources. Among these groups were communal mass-based groups, youth 
groups, pan-Niger Delta elite groups, and state governments. One of the best 
known and well-organised groups that effectively articulated the position and 
demands of the Niger Delta communities was the MOSOP.  
 
 
Communal mass-based agitation in the Niger Delta:  
the case of the Ogoni  
 
Among the organisations that have agitated for resource control and protested 
against the debilitating effects of oil exploration in the Niger Delta, many of the 
communal mass-based ones seem to have been more effective. These organisa-
tions are made up of people from different segments of their societies, ranging 
from educated elites to clan heads, traditional leaders and youths.2 Many are 
                                                 
2  For a list of many of these ethnic and communal-based associations, see Ikelegbe, 2001b: 
444-445. 
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grassroots organisations that enjoy massive grassroots support and have mainly 
committed, rather than self-seeking leaders. The marginalised and dispossessed 
citizens of the communities (at least the overwhelming majority of them), trust 
these movements to effectively represent their interests and therefore actively 
participate in the mass protests organised by the associations. The MOSOP ade-
quately exemplify such mass-based communal movements.  
 It might be argued that the leaders of MOSOP like Ken Saro-Wiwa, the 
most prominent leader of the movement, had held various state and federal 
prestigious appointments, while others like Ben Naanen, a university teacher, 
belong to the class of intellectual elite. From this perspective, it can be said that 
they do not constitute part of the marginalised and dispossessed citizens. How-
ever, what is significant is the actual interest and tendencies that these leaders of 
the movement represent. Their motivation cannot be interpreted from the per-
spective of the desire for greater access to state power (Osaghae, 1995: 331-332), 
for if that were the case, they could have attained this through other self-seeking 
means without subjecting themselves to the severe persecutions they endured. 
Indeed, they were galvanised into action by the debilitating political, material 
and environmental deprivations and degradations that their communities had 
endured over the years. This is the reason why their actions were mass-based. 
This also accounts for their ability to elicit the support of the overwhelming ma-
jority of members of their communities as well as attract unprecedented interna-
tional attention to the plight of their communities. The leaders of MOSOP can, in 
fact, be seen as intellectuals of the struggle for resource control as well as citizen-
ship rights of the Ogoni people. 
 The high level of articulation of the Ogoni situation in various position 
papers, speeches and interviews by MOSOP leaders, as well as the internation-
alisation of the Ogoni predicament, turned MOSOP into the poster child of the 
struggle against the marginalisation, deprivation and dispossession of the oil-
producing communities. Even then, it was the excellent degree of grassroots 
organisation of MOSOP that made it most effective and resulted in its successful 
mobilisation of the different segments of the Ogoni society. By 1995, MOSOP 
comprised many community-based organisations. However, the National Youth 
Council of Ogoni People (NYCOP) was the most radical of these organisations 
and was very well organised and disciplined. It was a sophisticated grassroots 
organisation and played a phenomenal role in the successful grassroots mobilisa-
tion of people all over Ogoniland (UNPO, 1995: 12-13). 
 The launching of the Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR) in October 1990, by 
MOSOP and Ogoni leaders introduced a new phase in the struggle for resource 
control and citizenship rights of the Ogoni people. It also contributed to the in-
tensification of the struggle against the degradation of their environment. Indeed 
the event could be said to have marked a turning point in the activism of the oil-
producing Niger Delta minority ethnic groups. The document detailed the vari-
ous acts of neglect, political and economic marginalisation of the Ogoni people, 
 





and the dispossession of their citizenship rights by the Nigerian State. It asserted 
the separateness and distinctiveness of the Ogoni nationality, and demanded:  
political control of Ogoni affairs by Ogoni people; the right to the control and 
use of a fair proportion of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni development; 
adequate representation as of right in all Nigerian national institutions, and 
the right to protect the Ogoni environment and ecology from further degrada-
tion. (MOSOP, 1992: 11) 
MOSOP based its argument for the Ogoni control of its natural resources on 
ethnic citizenship rights arguing that since Nigeria is a federation of ethnic 
groups, ethnocentrism is prevalent in the country. It noted that the ‘rights and 
resources of the Ogoni have been usurped by the majority ethnic groups and the 
Ogoni consigned to slavery and possible extinction.’ However, given the ma-
nipulation of ethnicity by the Nigerian elite class who see the phenomenon more 
as a means of primitive accumulation, it is doubtful whether basing resource 
control on ethnic citizenship rights will actually benefit the majority of the com-
mon people.  
 Nevertheless, the Nigerian authorities interpreted the demands by the 
Ogoni people as a desire on their part to secede from the federation. But as was 
made clear by various Ogoni leaders, their desire was not to break away from 
the federation, rather they were demanding political and economic justice that 
would guarantee the various ethnic groups in the country a large measure of 
autonomy over their political and economic affairs. As was stated in the Ethnic 
Minority Rights Organisation of Africa’s (EMIROAF) proposal for the restructur-
ing of Nigeria, ‘the enthronement of true federalism in Nigeria,’ should allow 
‘each ethnic group the right of political self-determination, resources and envi-
ronmental control.’ However, EMIROAF’s insistence ‘that all constitutions 
should provide that any ethnic group can have a separate state if it so wishes at 
any time, and that it can secede from the federation if it so wishes,’ (EMIROAF, 
1994: 255) tended to inadvertently accord some credence to the secession allega-
tion.  
 In any case, the preponderance of the available evidence does not support 
the accusation of secession attempt on the part of MOSOP. It is true that MOSOP 
favoured a loose federation or even a confederation that would grant greater 
political and economic autonomy to the respective ethnic groups that comprise 
Nigeria. But it argued that a truly autonomous and fiscal federalism in Nigeria 
can only be attained through the convening of a Sovereign National Conference 
(SNC) under which the federating ethnic groups will determine the basis of the 
country’s union. Claude Welch (1995: 636) has pointed out that the demand by 
the Ogoni for local autonomy reflects a long-standing tradition in various Afri-
can countries in that most communities believe that ‘the distant state cannot be 
trusted to understand or act effectively on grass-roots priorities.’ 
 
J. I. Dibua 
 
14 
Furthermore, MOSOP posed the Ogoni struggle in the form of ethnic minority 
citizenship rights against their triple dominance and exploitation by the Nigerian 
State, the majority ethnic groups and the oil companies. The concept of ‘indige-
nous’ or ‘internal colonialism’ has therefore been employed to describe the dis-
possession of their citizenship rights and their reduction to a level akin to sub-
jects rather citizens. According to Ben Naanen (1995: 50): 
internal colonialism in Nigeria’s oil-producing communities can be located at 
the conjuncture of three principal developments: first, ethnic-based political 
domination, which is used to expropriate the resources of the oil communities 
for the benefit of the dominant groups; second, the alliance between the 
dominant groups, the oil companies and state enterprises, which restricts the 
minorities’ access to the modern and more rewarding sectors of the oil econ-
omy; and, third, oil-based environmental degradation, which undermines the 
traditional peasant or fishing economy of the oil-producing areas without 
providing a viable economic alternative. 
 Ogoni complaints over the dispossession of their natural resources and the deg-
radation of their environment were made specifically against the Shell Petroleum 
Development Company (SPDC) and the Nigerian government. MOSOP pointed 
out that Shell’s oil exploration activities in Ogoniland since 1958 had been car-
ried out with reckless disregard to the environment and the natural resources of 
the area.3 It argued that it would appear as if Shell was deliberately prosecuting 
an ecological war on the Ogoni people, a phenomenon that it described as the 
committing of genocide on the Ogoni people that would eventually result in 
their extinction (Saro-Wiwa, 1992). MOSOP claimed that the complaint of Ogoni 
people over their marginalisation and the deprivation of their citizenship rights 
had been met with acts of intimidation and terrorism against them by Shell and 
the federal military authorities.  
 In the face of the increased repression by the Nigerian State, the Ogoni 
people adopted more militant acts of resistance to which the government re-
sponded with further brutal acts of repression. Between 1990 and 1993 the Ogoni 
people under the leadership of MOSOP embarked on various militant and pas-
sive acts of resistance which were ruthlessly repressed by the coercive agents of 
the Nigerian State resulting in massive destruction of Ogoni properties, maiming 
and killing of many Ogonis.4 Apart from the brutal repression of the acts of resis-
tance, the Nigerian government introduced a decree in 1992 declaring demands 
for a right to self-determination by any community and disturbances resulting in 
any disruption of oil production activities as treasonable acts, which could attract 
the death penalty. In line with this decree, the Nigerian government resorted to 
the detention of Saro-Wiwa and other Ogoni leaders, as well as the periodic 
                                                 
 
3  For a history of oil exploration in Ogoniland and the resultant adverse effects on the envi-
ronment, economy and society of Ogoni people, see Amadi, 1997 and Cayford, 1996. 
 
4  For details on the Ogoni resistance, see Osaghae, 1995; Naanen, 1995; and Cayford, 1996.  
 





breaching of Saro-Wiwa’s citizenship rights by impounding his passport and 
preventing him from travelling out of the country to attend international human 
rights conferences. In June 1993 following the successful boycott of the presiden-
tial election by the Ogonis, Saro-Wiwa was arrested and charged for acts of trea-
son. Again in May 1994 Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni leaders were arrested 
and charged with murder for which they were eventually executed in November 
1995 after what amounted to a kangaroo trial.  
 To undermine the resistance of the Ogoni people and cause division 
among the ranks of the oil-producing communities thereby checkmating their 
struggle for citizenship rights, the oil companies, the Rivers state and the federal 
governments allegedly resorted to the stage-managing or sponsoring of violent 
conflicts among the communities. Some of these conflicts involved the Ogonis 
and their neighbours. It is significant that before then many of these communi-
ties did not have noteworthy disagreements. Examples of such stage-managed 
and sponsored conflicts involving the Ogonis were the purported attack by the 
Andonis on the Ogonis between July and September 1993, the attacks on the 
Ogonis by the Okrikas in December 1993, and the Ndokis in April 1994 (UNPO, 
1995: 25). 
 The communal mass-based agitation by the Ogoni and other oil-producing 
communities, have helped to bring into sharp focus the degree of marginalisa-
tion, dispossession, misery and poverty of these communities. Moreover, in the 
face of this marginalisation and dispossession, the wealth from the lands of the 
oil-producing communities are used to develop other parts of the country and 
the capitals of the oil-producing states. At the same time proceeds from the oil 
wealth, are accumulated by the Nigerian bourgeoisie and their foreign collabora-
tors. This situation has serious implications for the citizenship rights of the oil-
producing communities. It shows that they suffer from multiple layers of mar-
ginalisation and dispossession, which have in fact made them to be more of 
‘colonised’ and repressed subjects rather than citizens. 
 
 
Niger Delta states and collaborative elite-led agitation  
 
The agitation in the Niger Delta minority areas assumed a new dimension with 
the advent of the current civilian administration in 1999. Of course there had 
been a rather sustained agitation for resource control by the various communi-
ties in these states under successive military regimes, especially under the re-
pressive regimes of Babangida and Abacha. However, the organisational charac-
ter of the agitation underwent some significant changes from 1999. As already 
noted, the pre-1999 agitation recorded some modest achievements, mainly suc-
cessive minimal increases in the percentage assigned to derivation in the revenue 
allocation formula, eventually rising to 13 percent in the 1999 constitution. Sec-
tion 162(2) of the 1999 constitution guaranteed a minimum percentage for deri-
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vation. The section contained a proviso ‘that the principle of derivation shall be 
constantly reflected in any approved formula as being not less than thirteen per 
cent of the revenue accruing to the Federation Account directly from any natural 
resources.’  
 With the advent of a new civilian administration, the oil-producing com-
munities felt that they were free from the repression of authoritarian military 
regimes. They therefore more forcefully put forward their case for resource con-
trol and citizenship rights. They were further encouraged by Olusegun 
Obasanjo’s campaign promise to adhere to the principles and practice of true 
federalism which they interpreted as entailing the protection of their citizenship 
rights and guaranteeing them control over their natural resources. The massive 
support that Obasanjo received from the oil-producing communities in the Feb-
ruary 1999 presidential election further helped to promote their optimism. How-
ever, when it became clear that Obasanjo was not committed to honouring his 
electoral promise, the pace of agitation for resource control increased. Just as was 
the case with the previous dictatorial military regimes, the Obasanjo administra-
tion adopted a repressive approach to the agitation with the Odi massacre of 
November 1999 being the high point of this repression (Don-Pedro, 1999; On-
wuemeodo & Ogwuda, 1999). 
 However, while the communal mass-based agitation continued, two other 
prominent patterns of agitation at the organisational level, were adopted, 
namely at the level of state governors and pan-Niger Delta NGOs. The gover-
nors of the six South-South Niger Delta minority states, came together to de-
mand that their states should have greater control over the proceeds from the 
natural resources obtained from their territories. In addition, together with the 
governors of the other littoral states (Ogun and Ondo), they called for the abrog-
tion of Decree No. 9 of 1971, so that revenue obtained from offshore crude oil 
exploration can be included in calculating the derivation fund. 
 There has been a proliferation of pan-Niger Delta NGOs, with the bulk of 
them emerging in the late 1990s.5 As is the case with the governors of the Niger 
Delta states, these organisations demand the exercise of control over natural 
resources by the oil-producing communities. They equally draw attention to the 
marginalisation, neglect, dispossession of citizenship rights, and other forms of 
injustice experienced by the oil-producing communities, in addition to the catas-
trophic environmental degradation caused by oil-exploration. 
 Both the state governors and the pan-Niger Delta NGOs situate their de-
mand within the context of the desire for the operation of true federalism. They 
argue that true federalism and the guarantee of citizenship rights can only oper-
ate in Nigeria if the constituent units of the federation control the proceeds from 
the resources located on their on- and offshore territories (Ejobowah, 2000). To 
                                                 
 
5  Ikelegbe (2001b: 448-451), provides a rather comprehensive list of the pan-Niger Delta 
NGOs.  
 





them, this objective can be more credibly achieved through derivation. As stated 
by David Dafinone (2000: 46), a leader of the Union of Niger Delta (UND), the 
union’s position is that true federalism entails ‘a 100 per cent resource control by 
the ethnic nationalities with appropriate tax paid to the Federal government.’ In 
addition, the continental shelf ‘belongs to the ethnic nationalities adjoining it, 
and as such, all resources derivable from the Continental Shelf belong to those 
nationalities.’ Indeed, the communique of a conference on ‘The Niger Delta and 
Nigerian Federalism’ held at Effurun, Delta State in February 2001 very clearly 
summarised their position. The communique noted that there was ‘disposses-
sion, exploitation and impoverishment of the people of the Niger Delta.’ It stated 
that the 13 percent derivation fund was not adequate for redressing the envi-
ronmental degradation and other problems caused by oil-exploration in the 
Niger Delta. It demanded that the minimum percentage for derivation should be 
50 (cited in Djebah, 2001). 
 
 
Contradictions and limitations of the resource control movement  
 
There is no doubt that both the governors of the Niger Delta states and the pan-
Niger Delta NGOs correctly analyse the negative effects of oil exploration on the 
environment and lives of the inhabitants of the oil-producing communities. They 
also adequately elucidate the issues involved in the resource control controversy. 
But to what extent do they adequately represent the interests of the ordinary 
citizens of the oil-producing communities? If the proceeds from the natural re-
sources are vested in the hands of the state governments of the oil-producing 
areas, will they use them to advance the material and social conditions of the 
ordinary people? In other words to what extent can the governments of the Ni-
ger Delta states, the collaborative elites, and the leaders of the NGOs be counted 
upon to protect the citizenship rights of the people from the oil-producing com-
munities? In fact, there are no concrete evidence that the modest amounts that 
have been allocated to the state governments under the derivation principle have 
been used to promote positive changes in the material and social conditions of 
the people in the respective states. In short, the state governors who currently 
claim to champion the issue of resource control on behalf of the citizenship rights 
of their people can be said to be guilty of opportunism. 
 A similar observation equally applies to most of the pan-Niger Delta 
NGOs. The antecedents and characters of most of the leaders of these elite-based 
organisations clearly show that their joining the bandwagon of resource control 
is on the basis of opportunism and the desire to have access to the resources that 
will accrue to their respective states. They want to benefit from both sides of the 
spectrum, hence while being part of the exploitative power structure at the na-
tional level they seek to maintain their relevance and influence at the local level 
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by cashing on the popularity of the resource control agitation. There are of 
course a few active members of these NGOs who are genuinely motivated by the 
protection of the citizenship rights of the inhabitants of the oil-producing areas. 
These individuals such as Itse Sagay, a prominent Nigerian lawyer and aca-
demic, and one of the most vocal advocates of resource control, can be character-
ised as the intellectuals of the agitation. 
 An even worse case of the contradictions and limitations of the movement 
is the proliferation of a number of criminally minded individuals and organisa-
tions who have used resource control advocacy as an opportunity to embark on 
criminal activities. These individuals and organisations are engaged in acts of 
terrorism, inter- and intra-communal conflicts, extortion, sabotage, kidnapping 
and various other ignoble acts. At the height of the MOSOP activism for in-
stance, bands of young men calling themselves vigilante groups emerged. They 
used the name of MOSOP and NYCOP to engage in criminal activities and in 
terrorising people. MOSOP was compelled to issue a number of notices warning 
the public about the criminal activities of these vigilantes and calling for the 
arrest of some of their known leaders.6 It may well be that some of these crimi-
nally minded youths had some affiliations with NYCOP. However, in the face of 
the acute level of neglect and the degree of anarchy that prevailed in Ogoniland 
in the 1990s, even a well organised body such as NYCOP tended to lose control 
over the activities of some of its members.  
 Ironically, the continuing neglect of the oil-producing communities, and 
the brutal methods adopted by the federal government to suppress the milita-
rised agitation for resource control by Niger Delta youth organisations, helped in 
winning some form of legitimacy for the criminally minded youth organisations. 
This is clearly demonstrated by the activities of some of the youth organisations 
associated with the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), a pan-Niger Delta umbrella body 
of various Ijaw youth associations. On the basis of the continuing environmental 
degradation, neglect and marginalisation of the citizenship rights of the oil-
producing Ijaw communities, over 5,000 Ijaw youths representing 25 youth or-
ganisations, and drawn from 500 communities and 40 clans met at Kaiama, 
Bayelsa state on 11 December 1998 to form the IYC. The meeting came up with 
the Kaiama Declaration, which stated the grievances, objectives and demands of 
the IYC as well as signaled the intention of Ijaw youths to adopt a confronta-
tional approach to the state in their demand for resource control. This confronta-
tional approach was justified on the ground that the Ijaws were suffering from 
                                                 
 
6  There is controversy over who actually established the vigilante groups. Both the federal 
and Rivers State governments claimed that the vigilantes constituted the militant wing of 
MOSOP and were made up of NYCOP members. A similar view is held by Desmond Orage, 
the son of one of the four Ogoni chiefs whose murder led to the arrest, prosecution and 
execution of Saro-Wiwa (Orage, 1998). MOSOP on the other hand claimed that the vigilante 
groups were set up by politicians to further their political goals. See UNPO, 1995: 15.   
 





„enslavement” perpetuated by the oil-companies and ‘the fraudulent contrap-
tion called Nigeria’ (Chukwurah, 1999: 23). 
 Furthermore, the Kaiama Declaration decried the degradation of the 
environment of Ijawland by the oil-producing companies acting in collusion 
with the Nigerian state. It declared that all the resources located on Ijawland 
belong to the Ijaw people and proclaimed the „de-recognition” of all 
„undemocratic” decrees that „robbed” the Ijaws of ownership and control of 
their natural resources. While calling for the immediate withdrawal of all 
military forces from Ijawland, the IYC warned that any oil company that 
engaged the services of members of the Nigerian armed forces for protection, 
would be deemed an enemy of the Ijaw people. In addition, the Ijaw youths 
demanded the immediate cessation of oil exploration and exploitation in 
Ijawland and gave the oil companies a nineteen-day ultimatum expiring on 30 
December 1998, to withdraw all their staff from Ijawland (Chukwurah, 1999). 
 The expiration of the nineteen-day ultimatum set the stage for violent 
confrontation between various Ijaw youth organisations and the coercive institu-
tions of the Nigerian state culminating in the Odi massacre of November 1999. 
On the basis of the Kaiama declaration, there was a proliferation of Ijaw youth 
organisations with many of them criminally minded. The criminally minded 
organisations resorted to kidnapping of the staff of oil companies, extortion, 
sabotage of oil installations, the lucrative business of stealing crude oil from 
pipelines and marketing it on the „black” market and the kidnapping and mur-
der of security personnel. 7  At the same time, the Nigerian state aggravated the 
situation, by sending armed military personnel into Ijaw areas that savagely 
repressed the uprisings. Indeed, with the proliferation of criminally minded Ijaw 
youth organisations, the IYC tended to lose control over the activities of these 
organisations (Ikelegbe, 2001a: 13). The killings of twelve policemen by Ijaw 
youths in Odi, Bayelsa state in early November 1999 was repressively met by the 
Nigerian state through the now infamous Odi massacre (Don-Pedro, 1999). The 
activities of these criminally minded Ijaw and other Niger Delta youth organisa-
tions, clearly help to expose some of the opportunism and contradictions associ-
                                                 
 
7  A leaked confidential 93 page report funded by the Shell company, and conducted by 
WAC Global Services (Lagos), from December 2003 said that an increase in crime in the 
poverty-stricken Niger Delta could force Shell out of onshore production in Africa’s largest 
oil producer by 2008. Shell executives admitted the company had inadvertently added to the 
violence, saying it was difficult to operate ethically in the Niger Delta and that its attempts at 
community development „had been less than perfect.” For details, see D. Mahtani, „Oil 
Giant Shell Admits it Fuels Nigeria Violence”, Lagos, 14 June 2004; 
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/06/13/1087065033937.html?oneclick=true; 
27.07.04; “Unrest has Big Impact on Nigeria Oil Output”, Bloomberg, International Herald 
Tribune, 11.06.2004; http://www.iht.com/articles/524461.html, 27.07.04. (I am grateful to 
Dirk Kohnert for these sources). 
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ated with the resource control movement. None the less, the contradictory and 
conflicting tendencies not withstanding, the demand for resource control, re-
mains a worthy cause that needs to be meaningfully addressed in other to pro-
tect the citizenship rights of the Niger Delta people. 
 
 
Obasanjo administration’s response to the resource control agitation  
 
The Obasanjo administration has opposed the quest for resource control by the 
oil-producing communities. Rather, the administration responded to the agita-
tion by adopting an institutional developmentalist approach as manifested in the 
establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). An impor-
tant function of the Commission is to „conceive, plan and implement, in accor-
dance with set rules and regulations, projects and programmes for the sustain-
able development of the Niger Delta area …” (Federal Government of Nigeria, 
2000). The federal government was expected to contribute 15 percent of the total 
monthly statutory allocation and 50 percent of the ecological fund (due to mem-
ber states), to the Commission while the oil companies operating in the Niger 
Delta area, were expected to contribute 3 percent of their total annual budgets. A 
significant shortcoming of the NDDC act is the failure to provide for prior con-
sultation with oil-producing communities before initiating developmental pro-
jects (Frynas, 2001: 39). 
 Available evidence indicate that the NDDC has, at best, recorded modest 
achievement mainly in the construction of roads and building and equipping of 
primary school classrooms (The Guardian, 3 August 2003; Daniel, 2004). How-
ever, the Commission has been characterised by administrative instability, con-
troversies between it and the governors of the oil-producing states and more 
significantly, allegations of fraudulent practices on the part of its officials (Lawal, 
2003; Ogbodo, 2004a). In addition, both the federal government and the oil com-
panies have not been adequately meeting their financial obligations to the Com-
mission: the federal government has been contributing 10 percent while oil 
companies have been contributing two percent and some have defaulted (Og-
bodo, 2004b). Moreover, most parts of the Niger Delta have not benefited from 
any NDDC project. Thus, the NDDC does not constitute the solution to the issue 
of resource control and the promotion of sustainable development in the Niger 
Delta.    
 Another way in which the federal government responded to the resource 
control agitation was to take the 36 states of the federation and the Abuja federal 
territory to the Nigerian Supreme Court on 7 February 2001, over the issue of 
offshore natural resources. Although the lawsuit was ostensibly brought against 
all the state governments, its actual targets were the Niger Delta and the littoral 
states. According to the then Attorney-General of Nigeria, the late Bola Ige, the 
lawsuit was in response to the claims of the littoral states „that the natural re-
sources located offshore ought to be treated or regarded as located within their 
 





respective states” (cited in Onwubiko & Ollor-Obari, 2001). The federal govern-
ment therefore asked the Supreme Court to determine the seaward boundary of 
a littoral state within the country for the purpose of calculating the amount of 
revenue accruing to the federation account directly from any natural resources 
derived from that state. It also requested the court to declare that ‘the natural 
resources located within the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of 
Nigeria are subject to the provision of any treaty or other written agreement 
between Nigeria and any neighbouring littoral foreign state, (and are) derived 
from the Federation and not from any state.’ (cited in Djebah, 2001b) The deci-
sion by the federal government to take the resource control issue to court was 
widely criticised as an attempt to perpetuate the marginalisation and deprivation 
of the citizenship rights of the people of the oil-producing communities (Darah, 
2001a; 2001b; Dafinone, 2001). It has been argued that the issue could only be 
more meaningfully addressed through a political rather, than, a legal solution 
(Djebah, 2001a).  
 The Supreme Court’s ruling of 5 April 2002 upheld the federal govern-
ment’s position and vested it with the control of offshore natural resources. 
However, the ruling amounted to a pyrrhic victory for the federal government. 
The judgement endorsed the principles of true and fiscal federalism by declaring 
as unconstitutional, the federal government’s deductions at source of revenue 
accruing to state governments for the purpose of meeting some of the obligations 
of the states in question. It also declared as unconstitutional, the federal govern-
ment’s exclusion of natural gas, capital gains tax and stamp duties as constitu-
ents of derivation. 
 More significant is the fact that the issues generated by the Supreme 
Court’s judgement and its aftermath ironically reinforced the need for a political 
solution to the resource control controversy. The initial attempt by the federal 
government to find a political solution through a bill it sent to the national as-
sembly, abrogating the distinction between onshore and offshore in terms of 
natural resources was marred by controversy over what constitutes the continen-
tal shelf of a littoral state. The national assembly passed a bill that put the conti-
nental shelf at 200 nautical miles but Obasanjo refused to sign the bill into law, 
insisting that the continental shelf should not exceed 24 nautical miles.  
 However, after much controversies and meetings between the federal 
government and stakeholders in the resource control issue, a compromise 
solution was eventually negotiated between Obasanjo and the national as-
sembly. On 20 January 2004, the national assembly passed a compromise bill 
that abrogated the on- and offshore dichotomy. The bill limited the continen-
tal shelf of Nigeria upon which the littoral states have the right to derivation 
revenue to 200 meter water depth isobath8 (Ogbodo et. al., 2004; Agande & 
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Aziken, 2004). Obasanjo signed the bill into law on 16 February 2004. In abro-
gating the onshore/offshore dichotomy, the new law stated that „for the pur-
poses 
 of the application of the principle of derivation, it shall be immaterial 
whether the revenue accruing to the Federation Account from a state is de-
rived from natural resources located onshore or offshore.” (quoted in Ogbodo 
& Daniel, 2004; Aziken, 2004) This new law has won the approval of most of 
the stakeholders involved in the resource control controversy.  
 
   
Conclusion  
              
The unconscionable neglect and dispossession of the oil-producing communities 
are at the root of the crisis over citizenship rights and resource control in the 
Niger Delta. The oil-producing communities feel that the wealth produced from 
their natural resources have been excessively used to develop other parts of the 
country while also constituting sources of primitive accumulation for the Nige-
rian elites. As a result, members of communities believe that it is only through 
the operation of a true and fiscal federalism that they can be guaranteed their 
citizenship rights of exercising control over their natural resources.  
 Some of the different tendencies and contradictions in the resource control 
and citizenship rights agitation have helped to expose aspects of the limitations 
and opportunism of the civil society. A worse case of opportunism is repre-
sented by the government-led agitation for citizenship rights and resource con-
trol in the oil-producing states. State governments have used previous derivation 
funds mainly to provide facilities in the state capitals and local government 
headquarters, while the bulk of the funds were primitively accumulated by gov-
ernment officials, power and business elite. 
The pathetic case of Bayelsa State, which was created out of Rivers State, the 
leading oil-producing state in the country, helps to illustrate the culpability of 
state governments. The territory that makes up Bayelsa State accounts for a large 
chunk of Nigeria’s oil wealth. But when the state was created in 1996, it suffered 
from acute shortage of good roads, it was not connected to the national electric-
ity power grid and had no telephone linkage. In addition, there was a high de-
gree of environmental degradation, pervasive poverty and unemployment. Yet 
most of the wealth from the resources of the Bayelsa territory had been used to 
develop Port Harcourt, the capital of Rivers State, to which Bayelsa formerly 
belonged. As noted by Onumonu (2001), if an oil-producing community does 
not house either the state or local government headquarters, „its neglect becomes 
a foregone conclusion.”  
                                                                                                               
8  An isobath is a contour line connecting points of equal depth in a body of water.  
 





It therefore follows that neither the federal government nor the state govern-
ments or even the local governments do adequately protect the material interests 
and citizenship rights of the oil-producing communities. There should be a true 
and fiscal federalism with a prominent place granted to derivation in the reve-
nue allocation formula. The bulk of the derivation revenue should be paid into a 
trust fund from where they will be directly disbursed to the communities and 
local governments. The derivation revenue should be shared among the local 
governments and communities in proportion to the amount of revenue derived 
from their respective territories. The masses of the people of these communities 
and local governments should play major and critical roles in the way this reve-
nue is spent. This can be done through democratising local governments in such 
a way that the local governments are effectively and structurally linked with the 
institutions the people have developed at the village and clan levels (Dibua, 
1989; 1990). The so-called traditional rulers and other collaborative elite groups 
should not play any significant role in the process because they constitute part of 
the power structure that have exploited and marginalised their people. The 
communal institutions developed by the people at the local level should play 
dominant roles in the initiation and execution of projects that are meant to cater 
for their interests. The relevant local institutions include age grades, community 
development committees, youth and women organisations, and village unions. 
These institutions which emphasise communalism and co-operationism, have 
historically performed the critical role of mobilising the people for the execution 
of tasks aimed at transforming their communities. 
 A three-tier local government system comprising village councils, devel-
opment area councils and local government councils should be introduced. The 
village council comprising elected representatives of the communal institutions 
identified above, should be responsible for initiating and supervising the imple-
mentation of projects aimed at developing their communities. The development 
area councils made up of representatives of the village councils should coordi-
nate the activities of the village councils, ensure that projects located within their 
areas of jurisdiction are implemented and act as liaisons between the village 
councils and the local government councils. The local government councils 
whose members are directly elected by the people should coordinate the activi-
ties of the development area councils and ensure that the development projects 
are effectively implemented. Local governments need to employ more techni-
cally qualified staff in order to be able to successfully perform this supervisory 
task. Projects that are beyond the technical capability of the local institutions 
would be executed by the state government on behalf of the local communities. 
However, these communities should make significant input in the initiation of 
the projects and monitor the progress of the projects.  
 It might be argued that given the highly militarised situation in the Niger 
Delta, it would be difficult for the local political structures to perform develop-
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mental functions. But the militarised situation is itself a product of frustration 
and alienation among the inhabitants of the communities over the prevailing 
neglect and abject poverty. One way of winning their confidence is to grant con-
trol over the bulk of the revenue derived from their natural resources to the local 
institutions which would in turn use the revenue to implement communally 
agreed upon development projects. As noted by Ekeh (1975), most Nigerians are 
more loyal to their primordial institutions and believe that these institutions are 
more committed to serving their interests. In addition, the social sanctions that 
exist at the local level over the misappropriation of communally-owned wealth 
would help to curb the fraudulent use of the derivation revenue. These measures 
represent viable means through which the masses of people in the oil-producing 
communities can exercise greater control over their natural resources and protect 
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Der Kampf der Bevölkerung um Ressourcenkontrolle in Gebieten des Nigerdeltas, 
in denen Öl gefördert wird, spielte in Nigeria seit den frühen 1990er Jahre eine 
zentrale Rolle in der Auseinandersetzung über die nationale Frage, die ethnische 
Minderheitenpolitik und das Thema Umweltschädigung. Dies ist weitgehend 
zurückzuführen auf die Aktivitäten Ken Saro-Wiwas und dessen Bewegung für 
das Überleben der Ogoni People (MOSOP), die sehr dazu beitrugen, das Thema 
international populär zu machen. Die vorhandenen wissenschaftlichen Arbeiten 
konzentrieren sich auf die Bereiche ethnische Minderheitenpolitik, Umstrukturie-
rung des nigerianischen Föderalismus und Umweltschädigung. Dagegen gab es 
wenig Forschungsbemühungen über Bedeutung und Konsequenzen, die sich aus 
der Frage der Ressourcenkontrolle für die Bürgerrechte der nigerianischen Bevöl-
kerung ergeben, insbesondere für die Bewohner der erdölfördernden Gebiete. Die 
Marginalisierung der Bürgerrechte der minoritären ölproduzierenden Gebiete 
nährte den Einsatz einer Bewegung für ethnische Bürgerrechte als Grundlage für 
Ressourcenkontrolle. Dieser Beitrag legt dar, dass die Ausübung eines echten 
Föderalismus in Nigeria von einer sinnvollen Machtdezentralisierung auf lokaler 
Ebene begleitet sein muss, um eine bessere Kontrolle der lokalen Bevölkerung 
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Au Nigéria, les affrontements au sein de la population pour le contrôle des res-
sources naturelles dans les régions du delta du Niger, zones d’extraction du pé-
trole, tiennent depuis le début des années 1990 un rôle central dans les débats sur 
la question nationale et la politique envers les minorités ethniques ainsi que sur le 
thème de la dégradation de l’environnement. Ceci peut être largement rapporté 
aux activités de Ken Saro-Wiwas et de son mouvement pour la survie du peuple 
Ogoni (MOSOP), qui contribua fortement à populariser au niveau international 
ces questions. Les études scientifiques existantes se sont concentrées sur la politi-
que des minorités, la restructuration du fédéralisme nigérian et la dégradation de 
l’environnement. En revanche, très peu de recherches ont été menées sur 
l’importance et les implications de la question du contrôle des ressources naturel-
les pour les droits civiques de la population nigériane et en particulier pour ceux 
des habitants des régions d’extraction du pétrole. La marginalisation des droits 
civiques des minorités des régions pétrolières a nourri les revendications d’un 
mouvement en faveur de droits civiques ethniques comme fondement pour le 
contrôle des ressources naturelles. Cette contribution démontre que la pratique 
d’un réel fédéralisme au Nigéria doit être accompagnée d’une décentralisation 
pertinente du pouvoir au niveau local afin que la population locale puisse mieux 
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